The long-lived
"Anneliese" Here in Hungary March 1945 issued August
1944.
When
the Tiger II was being produced the time consuming complexity of the previous
heavy tank was much reduced: still the new design consumed a huge amount of raw
materials. In all these months, relentless attempts to get better performances
and simplify production were carried on. They interested in the most part
internal fittings, dictated by combat and living experiences, so are more
difficult to note. The true obstacles were always the bombings: they caused the
loss in production of at least (657 Tiger IIs (940 planned against 283
produced) in September 1944-March 1945 period.?)Henschel ceased all tank
production by the end of March. One may not be surprised if only a few units
received replacements while the others were literally left to fall in pieces.
Operational
history of the Tiger IIs is problematic: while this heavy tank was the optimum
on the paper, things on the battlefield went in different way from what the
Germans hoped. The 88mm L71 KwK 43 tank gun, joined by the excellent optics,
was able to pierce any enemy tank on long ranges; front armor was able to
withstand any enemy anti-tank gun, large battle tracks permitted the tank to
offer a ground pressure of only 0.74 Kg/cm2 (when the tracks sunk of
20 cm in the ground), speed of a remarkable maximum of 41.5 Kmh and a cruising
one of 38 Kmh on roads and 15-20Kmh on open terrain.
The
turret rotation speed was even more stunning, capable of turning by its
hydraulic gearing system (connected and depending from the engine) of 360
degrees in 19 seconds (with the engine at 2,000 rpm) for fine adjustments and
in less than ten seconds at the fastest speed (engine at 3,000 rpm, difficult
to achieve because of engine's overheating). The lowest speed for a full turn
was 70 seconds: low speed was used (and needed) for long range aiming/shooting (the
ideal role for the Tiger).
Reliability
continuously improved: a March 1945 German report stated that the operational
ratio of the tank in frontline units was 59 percent of the strength, second
only to the Panzer IV with 62 percent and much better than Panther at only 48
percent. This is against some common ideas which want the Tiger II as a big,
slow and unreliable monster. Many faults were overexploited by inexperienced
drivers but with mature drivers and the needed pauses for restoring and
maintenance reliability greatly increased.
Its
capabilities of negotiating obstacles were comparable to or better than that of
the other German or Allied tanks. Improvements also took the Tiger to had to
mount an integrated range-finder but the production of the modified turret,
which had to start in July 1945, never took place because the end of the war.
The true enemy were, as always, the planes. Air
attacks knocked out tanks in the factories, in the battlefield and disrupted
supplies of fuel and spare parts making the tanks incapable to exploit their
abilities. Many were abandoned due to poor mechanical conditions, lacks of fuel
and ammo. When they were put on the battlefield they proved to be more than
worthy opponents. Also a single tank was able to stop an Allied armored thrust
and impose an significant delay to the Allied formations. If properly supported
they could be reverted in counterattacks. A situation very similar to the 1941,
were the heavy KVs proved themselves against the Panzerdivisionen ...
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