Schürzen were used on the Pz.Kpfw.IV, Sturmgeschütz III and
Sturmgeschütz IV and the Panther. On the Pz.Kpfw.IV Ausf.J, the thin metal
sheets were replaced by a wire mesh (Thoma Schürzen). This type of Schürzen had
been a competitive design to the solid plates, but the plates were initially
chosen because production was easier with the existing machinery.
Schurzen began to show up about a year after the initial
invasion of Russia and some months before Zimmerit. Also consider that the
Tiger I design did not have schurzen. (Granted, the Tiger II fenders were
specifically designed to afford HEAT protection, but really, this later design
reinforces the evolving German realization of the HEAT threat.) As Paul points
out, though, the protection against HEAT was serendipity. The later development
of the mesh von Thoma [1] Schild and the leaving of schurzen on the Panther G
are certainly evidence that the Germans became aware of the protection afforded
against HEAT, but this was not the original intent. Plate schurzen gave way to
"Thoma Shields" made from steel mesh, hung from metal pipes as
opposed to angle iron brackets.
Thoma - or Drahtgeflechtschürzen were adopted in September
1944, starting with Pz IV Ausf. J Fgst.Nr. 92301, so any unit receiving Pz IV
Ausf. J after this date should theoretically have them, although the usual
first in/ last out process of assembling tanks may throw a spanner or two in
the works here.
This is a direct quote from Walter Speilberger's
"Sturmgeschutz & Its Variants", page 92; "the previously
mentioned Schurzen side-skirts became a topic of discussion during the Fuhrer's
conference on 6 and 7 February 1943. Hitler was quite in agreement with
mounting the skirts on the Panzer III, IV and Sturmgeschutz to provide
protection against Russian anti-tank rifles".
However, the Thoma shield style of mesh would be effective
against A/T rifles and also HEAT rounds.. The size of the mesh will not allow
the round to pass through it unscathed and all that’s required is to upset its
flight which the mesh will do quite nicely. Tom Jentz has shown the Panther
wasn’t even going to be accepted without its shields to defeat the A/T rifles. The
entire Panther project was nearly cancelled because the lower hull armour was
considered to weak to withstand (future?) Soviet AT-rifles. Had it not been
possible to put Schürzen on the Panther, it would have been replaced by the
Panther II! (See Jentz: "Panther..." p. 35 and 53)
Out of interest the cyclone fence mesh carried by AFV’s in Vietnam as anti-RPG screens worked by not detonating the round but actually shorting the firing circuit as it passed through. I have seen a training film with a dozen rounds fired and all failed to explode.
Out of interest the cyclone fence mesh carried by AFV’s in Vietnam as anti-RPG screens worked by not detonating the round but actually shorting the firing circuit as it passed through. I have seen a training film with a dozen rounds fired and all failed to explode.
[1] Wolfgang Thomale
Inspector General of Armored Troops Colonel-General Heinz Guderian
staffed his Berlin headquarters on Bendlerstrasse with combat-experienced armor
officers. For his chief of staff he chose the talented Wolfgang Thomale, an
exceedingly capable organizer and staff officer. Thomale played an ever greater
role in developing the panzer force because Guderian could not abandon his
"hands-on" approach to problem solving, which constantly took him
away from headquarters to the tank factories, training commands, higher
headquarters, and formations in activation or reconstitution. Much of the
day-to-day running of his headquarters Guderian effectively left to Thomale,
something he again failed to acknowledge in his memoirs.
On 21 July 1944, appointed Acting Chief of the General Staff, Guderian simultaneously remained
Inspector General of Armored Troops (he adamantly refused to relinquish the
position), but of course, of necessity, day-to-day control of the armored
forces increasingly passed to his able deputy, Thomale. Together, they
shepherded a series of formidable new armored fighting vehicles into service
during the fall of 1944-the Tiger II heavy tank, the excellent Jagdpanzer IV/70
tank destroyer, and the formidable Jagdpanther. These new weapons and the
continuing increase in armored production-which peaked in the late summer-only
encouraged Hitler to resume the offensive in the west during the winter, when
the impact of Allied aerial mastery would be lessened.
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